Enforcing a Dispute Board’s decision: issues and considerations

by Nicholas Gould, Partner

Introduction

There has, for many years, been some considerable international interest in Dispute Review Boards ("DRBs") and Dispute Adjudication Boards ("DABs"), collectively referred to as Dispute Boards ("DBs"). The North American concept of a panel of three experts assisting with the smooth running of substantial projects and then making recommendations to resolve issues, disagreements and disputes that arise along the way was shown to have some success when initially introduced.

The concept spread and developed internationally, initially gaining support as an option to the FIDIC Orange Book in 1994 and as an option to the Red Book in 1996, then as a mandatory requirement throughout the 1998 Test Edition of the FIDIC suite of contracts. Jaynes notes that FIDIC retrenched without much explanation from the position of a mandatory DAB in the Red book to merely optional in the Yellow and Silver books. However, by this stage the non-binding recommendation had changed into a binding decision, thus transforming the recommendation process, that was often honoured because of the parties respect for the board members, into a binding dispute resolution procedure.

In 1999 FIDIC settled the tenants of its DAB procedure, and introduced the concept of a Dispute Review Expert ("DRE"), which is basically a single-person DB. The FIDIC DAB procedure became a permanent texture, and was included in all of its revised contracts. The World Bank then introduced a new edition of its Procurement of Works Procedure making the "recommendation" of the DRB or DRE mandatory, unless or until that recommendation was superseded by an arbitrator’s award. In 2004 the World Bank, together with other development banks and also FIDIC, started to work towards a harmonised set of conditions for DABs. FIDIC released, in 2005, the Multilateral Development Bank (MDAB) Harmonised Edition of General Conditions, containing a three or one person DAB.

The DRB used in North America as a system for the avoidance of disputes arising during the course of a project and then helping to resolve disputes by agreement and recommendation has, in effect, been replaced (at least for the world outside of North America) by a decision-making dispute-resolving function.

In 1999 FIDIC settled the tenants of its DAB procedure, and introduced the concept of a Dispute Review Expert ("DRE"), which is basically a single-person DB. The FIDIC DAB procedure became a permanent texture, and was included in all of its revised contracts. The World Bank then introduced a new edition of its Procurement of Works Procedure making the “recommendation” of the DRB or DRE mandatory, unless or until that recommendation was superseded by an arbitrator's award. In 2004 the World Bank, together with other development banks and also FIDIC, started to work towards a harmonised set of conditions for DABs. FIDIC released, in 2005, the Multilateral Development Bank (MDAB) Harmonised Edition of General Conditions, containing a three or one person DAB.

The initial questions about the use of DBs in practice, establishing, appointing, working with them and using them, has already received much debate. The key question at the...
moment is how to enforce a DB’s decision. Dering, in 2004, notes that the some difficult jurisdic-tional issues can arise when a DB decision has not been accepted by the parties as finally resolving the issues in dispute.

From a general legal perspective one might ask: what is the nature and standing of a DB’s decision? In particular, and by reference to FIDIC and other international construction and engineering contracts, the development banks’ procurement requirements and other institutional DB rules, the more specific questions that arise are:

1. In what sense is a DB’s decision binding? Or final and binding? Or final, and conclusive and binding? Is there any difference, and does it matter?

2. If a decision is binding, then does that mean that it can be enforced, where, for example, money is to be paid or some action is to be taken, and if so, how? Alternatively, is a party simply in further breach of contract by failing to honour the decision, but if so, how does the aggrieved party obtain redress?

3. Must an aggrieved party refer a failure to comply with the DB’s decision to international arbitration under the contract? If so, does that party ask the arbitral tribunal to enforce the DB’s decision, or the underlying dispute which resulted in the decision? In effect, can the tribunal give an interim award for the immediate enforcement of the DB’s decision, without considering the merits?

4. Can a party bypass the arbitration agreement and ask a court to immediately enforce the DB decision, perhaps on the basis that there is no dispute (a prerequisite to arbitration) but simply an enforcement (perhaps the payment of money) of a contractually binding DB’s decision?

5. Should, or could, a court treat a DB’s decision as an arbitral award? Would such an approach help or hinder the temporary enforcement of DBs’ decisions, or simply introduce additional problems, for example restrict the ability of an arbitral tribunal properly to hear at some later date the underlying merits of the original dispute?

6. How is all of this affected if one or both of the parties fail to issue a written notice of dissatisfaction with the DB’s decision or fails to serve a notice of intention to commence arbitration within the timescale set out in the contract? Consider further the possibility where a party disputes only part of the DB decision. Can that party only pursue that part which has not become final? What is the impact on the responding party who may find that their key defence to the “live” claim has not been disputed and is now unavailable for consideration by the arbitral tribunal?

These are some of the fundamental questions that are (or should be) considered either when drafting international construction contracts, or, more pertinently, when dealing with disputes that have arisen during the course of the works. In part, some of these issues can be analysed by reference to the particular terms in the contract. In this paper consideration is given to FIDIC, but in reality very careful consideration will need to be given to the particular words in the applicable contract.

However, the contract cannot be considered in isolation. The substantive law of the contract will establish the ground rules for the interpretation of the contract and, in particular, its dispute resolution procedure. The procedural law that applies to the arbitration will also have an impact. Further, substantive and procedural laws of the country or countries

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7 See in particular C Seppala (2009), Enforcement by an arbitral award of a binding by not final engineer’s or DAB’s decision under the FIDIC conditions, 2009 ICLR 414; and the related article C Seppala (2005), The Arbitration Clause in FIDIC Contracts for Major Works, 2005 ICLR 4.

8 Dering, Christopher (2004), Dispute Boards: It’s time to move on, 2004 ICLR 438.
where the enforcement will take place cannot be ignored. Quite clearly, if a DB decision is to be immediately enforced by a court then it is a consideration of the substantive and procedural laws of the applicable country or countries that will determine whether there is any chance of success.

Before turning to each of these keys issues, it is important to establish the contextual background, and the next section deals briefly with the rise of dispute boards.

The development of DBs

The terms “dispute review board” or “dispute adjudication board”, collectively dispute boards, are relatively new ones. They are used to describe a dispute resolution procedure that is normally established at the outset of a project and remains in place throughout the project’s duration. The board may comprise one or three members who become acquainted with the contract, the project and the individuals involved with the project, in order to provide informal assistance, provide recommendations about how disputes should be resolved, and provide binding decisions.

The one-person or three-person DBs are remunerated throughout the project, most usually by way of a monthly retainer, which is then supplemented with a daily fee for travelling to the site, attending site visits and dealing with issues that arise between the parties by way of reading documents, attending hearings and producing written recommendations or decisions, if and when appropriate.

More recently, DABs have come into use because of the increased globalisation of adjudication during the course of projects, coupled with the increased use of DRBs, which originally developed in the domestic North American major projects market. The use of DRBs has grown steadily North America, but they have also been used internationally. However, DRBs predominantly remain the providence of domestic North American construction projects. As adjudication developed, the World Bank and FIDIC opted for a binding dispute resolution process during the course of projects, and so the DAB was borne from the DRB system; the DRB provides a recommendation that is not binding on the parties.

According to the Dispute Review Board Foundation (“DRBF”) the first documented use of an informal DRB process was on the Boundary Dam and Underground Powerhouse project north of Spokane, Washington during the 1960s. Problems occurred during the course of the project, and the contractor and employer agreed to appoint two professionals each to a four-member “Joint Consulting Board”, in order that the Board could provide non-binding suggestions.

Subsequently, the US National Committee and Tunnelling Technology, Standing Sub-committee No. 4 conducted a study and made recommendations for improving contractual methods in the United States. Further studies were carried out, and the first official use of a DRB was made by the Colorado Department of Highways on the second bore tunnel of the Eisenhower Tunnel Project. This was as a result of the financial disaster encountered in respect of the first tunnel between 1968 and 1974.

According to the DRBF, the records from December 2003 show that there were 340 contracts comprising DRBs that were currently active in 2003. Of those projects, 1,261 recommendations were given by the DRBs and only, according to the DRBF’s records,

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28 matters went beyond the DRB process. In other words, only 2.2% of those disputes referred to the DRB progressed to arbitration or litigation. A more positive way of looking at this is that DRBs have a success rate of more than 97.8%.

More recent statistics have been compiled by the DRBF, and reported by Harman. More DBs have been used on at least 2,150 projects between the DRBF's inception 1975 and 2010. They have been used on projects for, amongst other things, tunnels, highways, rail, light rail, bridges, airports, container ports, buildings, schools, hospitals, sports stadiums, metro systems, pipelines, pumping stations, water treatment works, shopping centres, power plants, nuclear power plants, oil platforms, and waste facilities. This includes projects not just in the US but worldwide (and therefore DRBs and DABs).

In 2002 the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") Task Force prepared draft rules for DBs. The ICC DB Rules require a party to submit their dispute first to the DB before making a referral to arbitration, although this is not in Dorgan's view entirely clear from the drafting.

Genton, adopting the terminology of the ICC, describes the DAB approach "as a kind of pre-arbitration requiring the immediate implementation of a decision". He goes on to state that:

"The DRB is a consensual, amicable procedure with non-binding recommendations and the DAB is a kind of pre-arbitration step with binding decisions."  

Building upon this distinction, the ICC developed three alternative approaches:

- Dispute review board – the DRB issues recommendations in line with the traditional approach of DRBs. An apparently consensual approach is adopted. However, if neither party expresses dissatisfaction with the written recommendation within the stipulated period then the parties agree to comply with the recommendation. The recommendation therefore becomes binding if the parties do not reject it.

- Dispute adjudication board – the DAB's decision is to be implemented immediately.

- Combined dispute board (“CDB”) – this attempts to mix both processes. The ICC CDB rules require the CDB to issue a recommendation in respect of any dispute, but it may instead issue a binding decision if either the employer or contractor requests it and the other party does not object. If there is an objection, the CDB will decide whether to issue a recommendation or a decision.

Genton suggests that the third stage of a CDB would be the referral of a dispute leading to a binding decision, which would need to be implemented immediately. The ICC's approach is that the DB decides (if either party requests a decision) whether to issue a recommendation or an immediately binding decision at the second stage of the process.

According to the ICC the essential difference is that the parties are required to comply with a decision immediately, whereas the parties must comply with a recommendation but only if the employer and contractor express no dissatisfaction within the time limit. The combined procedure seems at first glance to be a somewhat cumbersome approach,
attempting to build upon the benefits of the DRB and DAB, without following a clear pathway. Nonetheless, it may prove useful for those parties that cannot decide whether they need a DRB or a DAB.

At the other end of the spectrum, a DB could be considered as a flexible and informal advisory panel. In other words, before issuing a recommendation, the DB might be asked for general advice on any particular matter. The DB will then look at documents and/or visit the site as appropriate and, most usually, provide an informal oral recommendation, which the parties may then choose to adopt. If the parties are not satisfied, the DB will proceed to the issue of a formal, albeit non-binding, written recommendation after following the formal procedure of exchange of documents and a hearing.

The FIDIC DAB provisions

The introduction of DABs in the FIDIC suit of contracts represented a major international turning point in the area of construction dispute resolution, with the introduction of DABs in its 1999 suite of contracts. In respect of the DAB, the FIDIC standard conditions of contract include:

- Clauses 20.2-20.8 - the Dispute Adjudication Board;
- Appendix - General Conditions of Dispute Adjudication Agreement;
- Annex 1 - Procedural Rules; and
- Dispute Adjudication Agreement (three-person DAB or one-person DAB).

This paper focuses on the specific DAB and arbitration provisions of the FIDIC Red Book 1999 Edition in order to consider the position in respect of enforcement of a DAB decision, with reference mainly to English law.

FIDIC Clause 20

The process for a referral of a dispute to the DAB commences with clause 20.4:

“If a dispute (of any kind whatsoever) arises between the Parties in connection with, or arising out of, the Contract or the execution of the Works, including any dispute as to any certificate, determination, instruction, opinion, or evaluation of the Engineer, either Party may refer the dispute in writing to the DAB for its decision, with copies to the other Party and the Engineer. Such reference shall state that it is given under this Sub-Clause.”

This clause is widely drafted, but perhaps limited by the word “including” because of the provision of a closed list. However, the clause goes on to state:

“The DB shall be deemed to be not acting as arbitrator(s).”

What then is the nature of a DAB? A replacement of the engineer’s decision-making function? The same or similar in nature to an expert determination? Clearly the DAB does not have the powers of an arbitral tribunal, nor can the decision be enforced in its
own right as if it were an award. The New York Convention 1958 does not apply to the
decision of a DAB, and so cannot assist in the enforcement of a DAB’s decision.

The DAB’s powers arise from the contract. The parties have agreed in the contract to
abide by the DAB’s decision. Failure to comply is simply a breach of contract by the
defaulting party. The contractual remedy is a referral to arbitration. The question is: does
one refer the failure to abide by the DAB’s decision or, does one refer the underlying
substantive dispute for a rehearing or as an appeal?

If the failure to comply is referred, then the request is simply for an immediate award
(without any consideration of the merits of the original dispute) so that the award
can be enforced. This may be appropriate where there is no notice of dissatisfaction. Alternatively, the actual dispute between the parties could be referred and, in effect, reheard by the arbitral tribunal. A party could of course refer both, but then request an
immediate interim award.

The referral of a dispute to the DAB and the binding nature of the DAB's decision is dealt
with in Clause 20.4. The important part at paragraph 5 of Clause 20.4 is:

> “Within 84 days after receiving such reference … the DB shall give its decision, which
shall be reasoned and shall state that it is a decision given under this Sub-Clause. The
decision shall be binding on both parties, who shall promptly give effect to it
unless and until it shall be revised in an amicable settlement or an arbitral award … Unless the Contract has already been abandoned, repudiated or terminated, the Contractor shall continue to proceed with the Works in accordance with the
Contract.” (my emphasis)

The decision must contain reasons. It is then contractually binding on the parties who
are to “give effect to the decision “promptly”. The immediate use of “unless and until”
in the same sentence is perhaps unfortunate. One reading of the clause is that it is not
binding at all if the decision is subject to potential revision in an arbitration that has or is
being commenced. If the time limits for challenging the DAB’s decision have passed, it
would then become final and binding and so should be enforced.

There is a useful distinction between the use of the term “binding” in this Sub-Clause and
the term “final and binding” in the last paragraph of Sub-Clause 20.4. In the absence of
a valid notice of dissatisfaction, the decision is not only binding but also final. So, once
final, the assumption seems to be that the DAB’s decision cannot be challenged, but
nonetheless, where a valid notice of dissatisfaction has been given, the DAB’s decision is
temporarily binding.

**Notice of dissatisfaction**

The parties could accept the decision of the DAB as resolving their dispute, presumably
honouring it or negotiating a different but acceptable resolution. If either party does not
accept the DAB’s decision that party must serve a notice of dissatisfaction in accordance
with paragraph 5 of Clause 20.4 which states:

> “If either Party is dissatisfied with the DAB's decision, then either Party may, within 28
days after receiving the decision, give notice to the other Party of its dissatisfaction
and intention to commence arbitration. If the DAB fails to give its decision within
the period of 84 days (or as otherwise approved) after receiving such reference, then
either Party may, within 28 days after this period has expired, give notice to the other
Party of its dissatisfaction and intention to commence arbitration.”

In order to avoid the DAB’s decision becoming “final and binding” either party may serve
a notice of dissatisfaction. The notice shall:

1  State that it is given under Sub-Clause 20.4;
2  Set out the matter in dispute; and
3  The reason(s) for dissatisfaction.

The substance and form of the notice must be adequate, in that the party serving it
must make it objectively clear that it is dissatisfied with the DAB’s decision, and why it is
dissatisfied.

Arbitration; selecting the applicable pathway

There are two pathways to arbitration under the standard FIDIC form. The first (under
clause 20.6) is in order to resolve disputed DAB decisions or where no DAB decision has
been issued, and the second (under clause 20.7) is to deal with the situation where there
has been a failure to comply with a DAB decision. In terms of enforcing a DAB decision
this means that the party referring the matter to arbitration has to select the applicable
arbitration clause, and draft a referral that reflects the requirements of that provision. The
key here is whether a notice of dissatisfaction has been given. The timely service of a
notice of dissatisfaction is a condition precedent to the referral of a dispute to arbitration
under clause 20.6.

The condition precedent to arbitration under clause 20.6

The route to enforcement by way of arbitration in respect of a DAB decision, which either
party is dissatisfied with, requires a consideration of the interrelationship between clause
20.4 and 20.6. Importantly, paragraph 6 of Sub-Clause 20.4 states:

“Neither party shall be entitled to commence arbitration of a dispute unless a notice
of dissatisfaction has been given in accordance with this Sub-Clause.” (my emphasis)

The words are restrictive, in that a prerequisite to arbitration under clause 20.6 is the
service of a notice of dissatisfaction. A failure to serve a notice has other ramifications,
which are set out in the last paragraph of Clause 20.4:

“If the DAB has given its decision as to a matter in dispute to both parties, and no
notice of dissatisfaction has been given by either Party within 28 days after it received
the DAB’s decision, then the decision shall become final and binding upon both
parties.” (my emphasis)

The arbitration agreement at Clause 20.6 states:

“Any dispute which has not been settled amicably and in respect of which the
DAB’s decision (if any) has not become final and binding shall be finally settled by
arbitration.”
In order to commence arbitration under clause 20.6 a notice of dissatisfaction must be issued within time. If the notice is not issued, then the DAB’s decision becomes “final and binding”, and any failure of either party to “promptly give effect” to the DAB’s decision can be referred to arbitration under clause 20.7. It is “the failure itself” to comply that is referred to arbitration. Nonetheless, the reference under clause 20.7 is made without the need to return to the DAB or to engage in amicable dispute resolution.

**Arbitration under clause 20.7**

What is the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction in respect of a referral under clause 20.7? Is it merely one of checking to see if the DAB itself had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, and then simply confirm the DAB decision in arbitration award without considering the merits? This may seem like a narrow interpretation, but it is only the “failure itself” that is referred under clause 20.7. However, the “open up review and revise” provisions in clause 20.6 apply, even to a reference under Clause 20.7. These provide:

“*The arbitrator’s shall have full power to open up, review and revise any certificate, determination, instruction, opinion or valuation of the Engineer, and any decision of the DAB, relevant to the dispute.*”

Adopting a broader interpretation, does the “open up, review and revise” power mean that the tribunal can in any event then revisit the merits and substance of the dispute and come to its own decision as to the facts, law and relief? If so, the tribunal could, after a short or summary procedure, give effect to the DAB’s decision by issuing an immediate interim award (final in respect of determining whether the decision should have been complied with) before proceeding to hear the entire dispute, either as an appeal on specific points or simply be hearing the dispute “afresh” from the beginning.

This approach would allow the tribunal to give effect to the DAB’s decision, but then to consider the merits of the dispute before issuing a final award. The problem with this broad approach is that, while clause 20.6 provides for opening up reviewing and revising, the right to arbitrate at all is based on a failure to comply and is in respect of the “failure itself”. The initial gateway to arbitration is in respect of that failure, not a dissatisfaction with the DAB’s decision. Rehearing the original dispute seems to go beyond a consideration of just the failure to comply with a DAB’s decision that has become “final and binding”. How important in practice is the distinction between a DAB decision that is “final” and one that is “final and binding”?

**Distinguishing “final” and “final and binding”**

If a party is by contract required to issue a notice within 28 days, or lose a right, then the service of that notice is a condition precedent to the exercising of that right. The House of Lords case of *Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Vanden Avenne Izegem PVBA* 14 provides authority for the proposition that, under English law, for a notice to amount to a condition precedent it must set out the time for service and make it clear that failure to serve will result in a loss of rights under the contract. Very clear words are required. The extent of any right that is lost in the absence of a notice of dissatisfaction is not immediately apparent. The binding decision becomes also final. Does finality mean that the right to challenge the rational of the DAB’s decision is the right that has been lost? If so then a party cannot dispute the DAB’s decision, and the arbitral tribunal cannot consider the original dispute, only the dispute about the failure to honour the decision?

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14 *Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Vanden Avenne Izegem PVBA* [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109, HL.
The tribunal’s function would be limited to either enforcing or refusing enforcement by way of award.

In *Essex County Council v Premier Recycling Limited* [2006] EWHC 3594 the terms for the appointment of an arbitrator provided that he should give a ‘final and binding decision’. Ramsey J. held that this did not exclude the parties’ right of appeal under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996. He accepted that an express reference to section 69 was not required, but an intention to exclude a process of appeal by a court must be very clear.

In *Shell Egypt West Manzala GmbH v Dana Gas Egypt Limited* [2009] EWHC 2097 (Comm) an application for permission to appeal a point of law was made, arising from an award made under the UNCITRAL Rules. The arbitration clause provided that the arbitral tribunal’s award “shall be final, conclusive and binding on the parties”. Mrs Justice Gloster DBE held that this term did not preclude the right of appeal. She agreed with the approach in *Essex County Council*, and considered that the additional term “conclusive” was simply confirmation that the award creates a *res judicata* and issue estoppel. It did not exclude the right of appeal.

However, parties could agree to exclude a right to appeal. For example, Article 28.6 of the ICC Arbitration Rules provide an express exclusion (from an appeal of the arbitration award to a court, not an appeal from the DAB procedure):

> “Every Award shall be binding on the parties. By submitting the dispute to arbitration under these Rules the parties undertake to carry out any Award without delay and shall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made.”

The UNCITRAL Rules adopt a more simple approach and do not go as far as excluding a right of appeal:

> “The award shall be made in writing and shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties undertake to carry out the award without any delay.”

A distinction can be made between an award that is to be carried out without delay, but still subject to appeal, and one that is truly final because the right to appeal has specifically been waived. Nonetheless, these articles relate to an appeal in respect of an arbitral award, not a DAB’s decision. There are, however, some English cases dealing with contractual certifiers and domestic adjudicators.

In *Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering Limited v Docklands Light Railway Limited* the contract provided that the employer’s representative could carry out the usual functions of the engineer. The arbitration clause had been deleted. The Court of Appeal held that despite there being no provision, the decisions of the engineer (in this case the employer who had taken on the role of the engineer) were to be “binding or conclusive”; the court, nevertheless, had no power to “open up, review or revise” those decisions. The contractor’s entitlement was therefore dependent upon the employer’s judgment. However, this cannot be said to now represent current English law.

The later case of *Beaufort Developments (NI) Ltd v Gilbert Ash NI Limited & Others* concerned the binding nature of final certificates issued under a construction contract. The contract provided that the final certificate was conclusive evidence as to some of the
matters under the contract. It had been thought that only an arbitrator with an express power to “open up, review and revise” a certificate could carry out such a function, but a court could not in the absence of an express power. The House of Lords in *Beaufort* took the view that a judge either had the power to open up, review or revise a final certificate, or could award damages in order to compensate a party for a certificate that was found to be incorrect. In so doing they considered that the decision is *Balfour Beatty* was wrong. Under English law, then, it seems that a judge can reconsider a certificate given under a contract that is expressed as being final and binding, or conclusive.

In *Beaufort* Lord Hoffmann recognised the potential for a two-tier dispute resolution process, stating:

> “It is less usual, though certainly theoretically possible, to add a second tier to arrangements of this kind, and to provide that a party who is dissatisfied with the view of one expert shall be entitled to call for the opinion of another, which shall then be final and binding. From the point of view of the court, the final outcome is no different from that in the case of a single expert. The contractual obligations of the parties depend upon the opinion of the one expert or the other and not upon its own view of the matter.”

Regardless of the number of opportunities for a decision to be made, the court will consider the contractual terms to determine whether it can replace the view of the contractual decision-maker with its own. In any event the final decision of the third party decision maker binds the parties.

This should be contrasted with a decision of an expert given under a contractual expert determination provision. In those circumstance the court will consider that the decision is final and cannot be reconsidered or appealed. Provided that the neutral expert has “answered the question” then the decision will be final and binding, regardless of any errors of fact or law. So, if the parties clearly and expressly agree that a decision of a neutral expert is to be final, binding and conclusive then the court will treat the parties as being bound by that decision. Very clear words are needed for a party to be bound by the decision of a contract expert determination.

What, though, is the position if an adjudicator’s decision deals with the issues referred, but there are other claims, counterclaims or set-offs which are to be determined? In the case of *Parsons Plastics (Research & Development) Limited v Purac Limited* a dispute was referred to an adjudicator. The contract stated that the adjudicator’s decision would be “final and binding” on the parties. The adjudicator found in favour of Parsons. Purac sought to set-off against that decision. The contract provided that Purac could serve a contractual withholding notice, but there was an argument that this procedure had not been followed. On appeal Lord Justice Pill stated, at paragraph 15:

> “It is open to the respondents to set-off against the adjudicator’s decision any other claim they have against the appellants which had not been determined by the adjudicator. The adjudicator’s decision cannot be re-litigated in other proceedings but, on the wording of this sub-contract, can be made subject to set-off and counterclaim. It is accepted that the respondents’ counterclaim, if they are entitled under the terms of the sub-contract to set it off against the claim, is arguable.”

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17 Northern Regional Health Authority v Derek Crouch Construction Co. Ltd [1984] Q.B. 644
20 In England, Wales and Scotland the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 provides a statutory adjudication procedure for “construction contracts” as defined in the Act. However, the case of *Parson* arose out side of the Act purely as a contractual dispute resolution process.
The adjudicator’s decision was final and binding, but only in respect of the disputed matters that had been referred. The Court of Appeal was not prepared to accept that an adjudicator’s decision under a contractual procedure should be enforced without taking into account a set-off. The judges were particularly concerned to see that the defendant had an opportunity to have its claims considered in a subsequent adjudication, because the adjudicator’s decision was final and binding, in order to produce an overall final and binding balance due between the parties as a result of dealing with all disputes between the parties.

Applying this logic, then surely a DAB’s decision that has become “final and binding”, might still be subject to being “opened up reviewed and revised”, not just because that power is set out in clause 20.6, but because there is no express bar against an appeal of the decision.

Statutory adjudication

A growing number of common law counties are familiar with rapid binding and enforceable statutory adjudication procedures, namely, England, Scotland, Wales, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. The English courts first encountered statutory adjudication in the context of construction disputes under legislation brought into force on 30 May 1998 by the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (HGCRA). Before considering the obvious route for enforcement (seeking an arbitration award, and then enforcing that), some consideration of how the courts in England have dealt with domestic adjudication is useful.

Once the HGCRA was brought into force, the key question was whether the courts would enforce a decision of an adjudicator. Section 108(3) of the HGCRA states that the “contract shall provide that the decision of the adjudicator is binding …” At the time, there was some concern about the appropriate way to enforce a decision of an adjudicator, and in particular whether summary judgment would be available or whether the court would hear the matter afresh in a full trial thus defeating the purpose of adjudication.

The first case of Macob Civil Engineering Limited v. Morrison Construction Limited21 swept away those concerns. The Hon. Mr Justice Dyson delivered his judgment on 12 February 1999 confirming that the decision of an adjudicator was enforceable summarily regardless of any procedural irregularity, error or breach of natural justice. The judge adopted a purposive approach to the construction of the word “decision”, refusing to accept that the word should be qualified.

The judges in the majority of the cases following Macob adopted a similar approach, enforcing adjudicator’s decisions that had found their way to the courts. The robust and purposive approach was reinforced by the first Court of Appeal decision of Bouygues v. Dahl-Jenson (UK) Limited22. The Court of Appeal delivered its judgment on 31 July 2000, upholding the first instance decision of Mr Justice Dyson. They confirmed that the purpose of the adjudication procedure set out in Section 108 of the HGCRA was to provide the parties to a construction contract with a speedy mechanism for resolving disputes, which although not finally determinative, could and should be enforced through the courts by way of summary judgment.
More importantly, even where an adjudicator had answered the question put to him in the wrong way, the court would not interfere with that decision but would enforce it. The decision of an adjudicator was and is being treated much like the decision of an expert resulting from an expert determination. Providing that an expert, and by analogy an adjudicator, has answered the right question then the decision will be enforced regardless of any errors made along the way. Only if the expert and therefore the adjudicator were to answer the wrong question would the decision be a nullity, because the adjudicator would not have jurisdiction to answer that “wrong” question. The emphasis under English law is very much one of “pay now – argue later”.

However, immediate summary enforcement of an adjudicator’s decision does not stop a party from repeating the dispute ‘afresh’ in subsequent court proceeding or arbitration.

Might an english court enforce an adjudicator’s decision without the need for an arbitral award?

Collins (Contractors) Limited v Baltic Quay Management (1994) Limited, 7 December 2004, CA (Civ), Brooke LJ, Clarke LJ and Neuberger LJ, concerned section 9(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996, and the meaning of ‘dispute’. Collins (Contractors) Limited carried out work for Baltic Quay Management under a JCT Minor Works Building Contract. Baltic did not pay an interim certificate and also amounts in respect of the final account but failed to serve a withholding notice. The contractor then determined the contract and issued proceedings in respect of the amounts.

Baltic applied to the court for a stay of the litigation pursuant to section 9(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996 on the basis that the contract between the parties contained an arbitration agreement. The contractor argued that there was no arguable defence to the proceedings in the absence of the service of a withholding notice, and therefore there was no “dispute” which was a prerequisite to the operation of section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996. Baltic argued that a dispute arose for the purposes of section 9 quite simply by a refusal to pay.23

The Court of Appeal held that the arbitration clause in the JCT Minor Works Building Contract was drafted in extremely wide terms such that if there was a dispute then it must be referred to arbitration. A dispute would be found to exist once a claim had been made that was not admitted. Discussions and negotiations in respect of issues were more likely to demonstrate the existence of a dispute.

It was clear to the Court of Appeal that Baltic did not admit the contractor’s claim and as a result there was a dispute. Baltic was, because of the existence of a dispute, entitled to stay the litigation proceedings pursuant to section 9(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996. The appeal was therefore dismissed. Collins was left to pursue the failure of Baltic to pay the interim certificate and the final account by way of arbitration pursuant to the JCT Minor Works Contract.

Might a court enforce an adjudicator’s decision that is given late?

The effect of an adjudicator’s decision given outside the 28-day time frame has been the subject of a number of recent English decisions. It has also been the subject of debate, with different decisions given in the English and Scottish courts. In Barnes & Elliott Ltd v Taylor Woodrow Holdings,24 His Honour Judge LLoyd QC held that a decision reached on day 28, but not communicated until day 29, was a valid decision.

23 Adopting the rational of Halki v Sopex [1998] 1 WLR 726.
His reasoning was based upon the express terms of the contract with which he was dealing, which do not apply here. Moreover, the Judge stressed that s.108 of the HGCRA "only confers authority to make a decision within the 28 day period". However, in Simons Construction Ltd v Aardevarch Developments Ltd, it was held that a decision that was reached over a week beyond the 28-day period was binding because the adjudication agreement had not been terminated by the time the late decision was provided.

In contrast, the Scottish Inner House of the Court of Session, in Ritchie Brothers plc v David Phillip Commercials Ltd, held that the 28-day limit meant what it said. Accordingly, they held that a decision that was not provided until a day after the expiry of the 28 days was a nullity, despite the fact that the delay in the provision of the decision had been just that one day. This decision was referred to favourably in the case of Hart v Fidler.

However, two more recent decisions (Epping Electrical Co. v Briggs & Forester; Aveat Heating Ltd v Jerran Faulkus Construction Ltd) of His Honour Judge Havery QC have confirmed that adjudication decisions given outside the 28-day time limit are not valid. His Honour considered that it would be undesirable for the HGCRA to be interpreted in different ways in England and Scotland and therefore he ought to follow the decision of Ritchie Brothers.

However, a decision communicated out of time was enforced by His Honour Judge Coulson in Cubitt Building & Interiors v Fleetglade as His Honour held that there was a distinction between reaching a decision and communicating a decision. A decision which was not reached within 28 days or any agreed extended date is probably a nullity but a decision which is reached within 28 days or an agreed extended period, but which is not communicated until after the expiry of that period, will be valid, provided that it could be shown that the decision was communicated forthwith.

**Jurisdictional challenges**

In respect of adjudication in the English courts the cases relate to the summary enforcement of the adjudicator’s decision. In the absence of a stay to arbitration, the courts are very willing to enforce an adjudicator’s decision. The valid challenges that can be made relate to the jurisdiction of an adjudicator. Providing that an adjudicator has jurisdiction to make a decision then there is a good chance that the decision will be enforced.

Jurisdiction can be considered under two main headings. The first relates to the initial jurisdiction of the adjudicator. In other words the crossing of the threshold in the first place. Essentially, does the adjudicator, or in our case the DAB have jurisdiction to consider the dispute and make a binding decision. This requires consideration of whether the DAB has been properly appointed, and whether a dispute has been properly referred to the DAB.

The second aspect of jurisdiction relates to the process itself. Assumed that an adjudicator has jurisdiction then it is possible to lose that jurisdiction along the way by some breach of natural justice, procedural error or by simply issuing the decision outside of the time period. An adjudicator, and arguably a DAB only has the power to deliver an award within the time set out in the contract. They do not have the power to extend the time, and therefore an award delivered late will be of no effect.

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Enforcing a Dispute Board’s decision: issues and considerations

Failure to comply with a FIDIC DAB’s decision

There are 2 interesting cases relating to the enforcement of a decision made under the FIDIC contract. The first deals with decision of the engineer made under the older FIDIC 1987 provisions, while the second deals with the issues head because it relates to the enforcement of an arbitration award, which in turn dealt with a failure of a party to promptly give effect to a DAB’s decision.

The reference to arbitration; under the Red book 4th edition

The interim and final awards in ICC Case 10619 relate to the binding nature of an Engineer’s decision given in respect of Clauses 11 and 67 of the FIDIC Red Book, 4th Edition (1987). The awards were dated March 2001 and April 2002 respectively. The place of arbitration was Paris, France. The Works comprised the construction of a road in an African state. The key parties were:

Contractor: Italian (Claimant);
Employer: A public authority in an African state (Respondent); and
Engineer: German.

The Claimant Contractor commenced arbitration for damages, claiming payment of the Engineer’s decisions under the Contract. The Claimant filed a request for arbitration with the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC on 11 August 1999. The Claim related to delay, disruption, a failure to grant possession of the site, exceptionally adverse weather and other delaying and disruptive events. On 11 February 2000 the Claimant requested the Arbitral Tribunal to issue an interim decision declaring that the Respondent should give effect to the Engineer’s decision given under Sub-Clause 67.1. Importantly, the Claimant was seeking an interim award for immediate payment of that decision regardless of the pending arbitration of the merits of the underlying dispute.

The claimant’s position

The Claimant argued that Clause 67.1 of the FIDIC Contract gave the Engineer power to decide, albeit on a provisional basis, applications made by the Contractor to the Engineer. Those decisions were binding and should be honoured. In this case four decisions had been given. The first two of 17 November 1998 dealt with two applications for an extension of time and additional payment. Further submissions for the time extension and additional payment were also made. The Engineer made a decision in respect of all four applications, but the Employer refused to execute the decisions.

The Claimant was seeking an interim award for payment of the amounts set out in the Engineer’s decision, together with interest at an earning rate of 7%. The amounts were expressed in the local currency, and the Claimant also sought conversion to US$ at the contractual rate.

The respondent’s position

The Respondent resisted the request for interim relief on a number of grounds:

There was no urgency for the payment to be made as the project was concluded, and the parties were now in arbitration. The Tribunal should focus on the substantive dispute. Once the entirety of that dispute had finally been decided, the Claimant could be adequately compensated by an allocation of interest in the final award.

The Claimant had not in fact established its case. It simply made an application to the Engineer, and the Engineer made a decision. The decision was disputed, and the Claimant had yet properly to prove its case.

To develop this argument further, the purpose of Clause 67.1 was to prevent disruption of the works pending a final resolution of the dispute. In other words, a decision would be given allowing the works to continue. That did not apply in this case as the decisions had been made after completion of the works.

The decisions would only become binding in the absence of a Notice of Disagreement. Both the parties had set out their disagreement with the decisions. As both parties did not accept the decisions this deprived the decisions of any binding nature.

In addition, there were some manifest technical errors with the decisions in any event:

1.1 The decisions had to be made within 84 days of the Contractor’s application. The first two made on 5 May 1999 were late. They had been provided after the time period set out in Clause 67.1. They were therefore void.

1.2 The Engineer identified the amount to be paid in local currency. However, the Claimant had brought a claim in US$. The Claimant was therefore not claiming the amounts nor the currency set out in the decisions.

1.3 The Engineer stated in his decisions that they were subject to the Employer’s prior approval. The Engineer, therefore, had not made a final decision. Further, no payment was possible in the absence of certificates of payment, which require prior approval of the Employer.

For all of the above reasons, the Respondent therefore asked the Arbitral Tribunal to dismiss the application.

The tribunal’s reasoning

The starting point was the procedure envisaged under Clause 67.1 of the FIDIC Red Book. This, in summary, comprises:

1 If any dispute arises out of or in connection with the Contract the matter shall in the first place be referred in writing to the Engineer. A copy is also provided to the other party.

11 The Engineer is to notify the parties of its decision within 84 days of the application. The Engineer must expressly refer to Clause 67 in order to make it clear that it is a decision under that Clause of the Contract.
12 If the Engineer fails to notify its decision within 84 days then either party, within a further period of 70 days, may notify the other of its intention to commence arbitration in respect of the matter in dispute.

13 If the Engineer notifies its decision within 84 days then either party can, within 70 days, serve a notice of its intention to challenge the decision by way of arbitration. That notice must be sent to the Engineer and the other party.

14 If a Notice of Intention to Challenge has not been served within 70 days then the Engineer’s decision shall become ‘final and binding on both parties’, and cannot be challenged in arbitration.

15 If the party serves a Notice of Dissatisfaction within the 70-day period the Engineer’s decision is not final. However, it is still binding on both parties and they shall comply with it. The second paragraph of Clause 67.1 specifically states:

“The Contractor and Employer shall give effect forthwith to every such decision of the Engineer unless and until the same shall be revised, as herein after provided, in an amicable settlement or an arbitral award.”

The Arbitral Tribunal paid specific attention to the deadlines, and therefore the dates on which a decision and Notice of Dissatisfaction were issued. The Engineer’s decisions of 5 May 1999 were late, in that they had been issued more than 84 days after the Contractor’s request for a decision. The Tribunal decided that those decisions could not bind the parties. This meant that the first two decisions were not binding.

The unfortunate ramification of this finding is that an Employer will be relieved from compliance with an Engineer’s decision simply because the Engineer’s decision was late. Further, the Contractor cannot be said to have any control over the matter. Surely it is, in effect, the Employer’s breach if the decision has been provided late, as the Engineer has been engaged by the Employer. Why should a breach by the Employer relieve the Employer of its duties under the Contract? Is this not a case of the Employer being able to rely upon a breach which was within its commission?

There are several English court decisions dealing with the giving of adjudicators’ decisions within the time limits. Initially, there was some disagreement between the judiciary as to whether a decision rendered late was void or perhaps still enforceable. However, it is clear that a decision given late is void and therefore unenforceable. However, an adjudicator’s decision could be distinguished from that of an Engineer. While an Engineer is to be impartial between the parties when rendering a decision, the Engineer is still engaged and paid by the Employer to conduct the Contract. On the other hand, an adjudicator is engaged to make a binding decision and must not just follow the procedures under the Contract but also be, or should be, truly impartial and independent of both parties.

Nonetheless, the Tribunal then went on to consider the previous decisions of 17 November 1998. They held that as the 5 May decisions were ineffective, those of November 1998 survived. They had been made within the 84-day period and so were valid decisions.

The Claimant had filed a Notice of Dissatisfaction within the 70-day period. It was also arguable that the Employer had expressed its disagreement within the time period. So, both parties had expressed their dissatisfaction with the decision. It was not as if only one party had expressed its dissatisfaction. Both parties did not accept the decision.
The Arbitral Tribunal held that, regardless of whether the decision had been subject to a Notice of Dissatisfaction or not, the Contract required the Engineer’s decision to have an immediate binding effect on the parties. The parties should therefore have complied with it. If the Employer failed to pay money in accordance with that decision then the Employer was in breach of Contract. More importantly, the Arbitral Tribunal took the view that the possibility that the decision may end up being opened up, reviewed, revised or set aside in the arbitration should not stop the Tribunal from giving immediate effect to the decision. They considered that this was the purpose of the terms in the Contract.

There were, however, several other issues which needed to be considered before the Tribunal could issue an award to that effect. First, the award would not be one of a conservatory or interim measure, but would give full and immediate effect to the decision. Neither the provisions of Article 23 of the ICC Rules nor the référé provision of the Rules of the French NCPC were, in the Tribunal’s view, relevant.

First, Sub-Clause 2.1(b) of the FIDIC Contract required the Employer to give specific approval in circumstances where the Engineer was certifying additional costs before payment. The Employer had given no such approval for payment of these decisions. The Arbitral Tribunal did not accept that this provided a defence to the Employer.

Second, Sub-Clause 2.1(b) of Part II of the FIDIC Conditions did not apply to decisions of the Engineer. The fact that the Engineer had mistakenly believed that consent was required did not invalidate the Engineer’s decision. The Engineer was required under Clause 67.1 to make a decision and this was regardless of any prior approval of the Employer.

Alternatively, if the Arbitral Tribunal was wrong and the Engineer’s decision did require approval then that would only affect the validity of the payment certificate. It would not affect the validity of the Engineer’s decision and the substance of it. The Employer was required under the Contract to give immediate effect to that decision and so by refusing to approve a certificate for payment the Employer was simply in further breach of Contract.

This, then, left the issues relating to currency and interest. The Tribunal considered that they could only really give effect and force to the decisions in their current state. The Contract provided for payment in a specific ratio between the local currency and US$. The parties were therefore bound to make payment in accordance with the Contract provisions. The Tribunal was not prepared to grant any interest. The Engineer’s decision did not deal with interest, and the Tribunal considered that further facts would be required in order to ascertain whether interest should be paid and for what period.

As an interim award the Tribunal therefore ordered payment, but reserved judgment with regard to interest, costs and fees. Provisional enforcement of the award was ordered.

In the final award the Arbitral Tribunal affirmed their interim decision. They also noted that they had the power to open up, review and revise any decision, opinion, instruction, determination, certificate or valuation of the Engineer, and so as part of the substantive dispute they could review the entirety of the underlying dispute and adjust or set aside the decision if and when necessary.
The reference to arbitration; under the Red book 1999 edition

In July 2010 the enforcement of an arbitration award, concerning an order for payment in respect of the DAB’s decision, came before the High Court in Singapore. The key issues were whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction to make the award, or whether the award should be set aside. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK (PGN) and CRW joint operation (CRW) entered into a contract for an onshore gas transmission pipeline. The contract was based upon a modified FIDIC 1st edition 1999 Red Book. Disputes arose which were referred to the DAB. The DAB issued several decisions, the majority of which were accepted except for one which was given on the 25th November 2008, requiring PGN to pay CRW US $17,298,834.57.

PGN issued a notice of dissatisfaction. Attempts at settlement failed. CRW referred to arbitration, under clause 20.6, the question of whether the DAB’s decision was correct. As a second dispute they referred PGN’s refusal to pay immediately the amount of the DAB’s decision. The key questions for the tribunal were, first, should they order immediate payment of the amount in the DAB’s decision, and second, should they open-up, review and revise the decision.

The tribunal issued a majority decision, concluding that the DAB’s decision was binding and that PGN should make an immediate payment. The majority tribunal award also concluded that they should not open up, review or advise the DAB decision, as this would amount to a defence to the tribunal’s order for immediate payment.

PGN sought an order from the Singapore court to set aside the tribunal’s award, under section 24 of the International Arbitration Act 2002.

The power to the tribunal to determine the question of how to deal with the issues referred to them required interpretation of clauses 20.4, 20.6 and 20.7. Under clause 20.4 a DAB’s decision “shall be binding on both Parties”.

“If the DAB has given its decision as the matter in dispute between the Parties, and no notice of dissatisfaction has been given by either Party within 28 days after it received the DAB’s decision, then the decision shall become final and binding upon both parties”.

Clause 20.6 provided:

“Unless settled amicably, any dispute in respect of which the DAB’s decision (if any) has not become final and binding shall be finally settled by international arbitration.”

The tribunal is given power under clause 20.6 to “open-up, review and revise any … decision of the DAB …”. However, if neither party serves a notice of dissatisfaction the decision will become final and binding, and failure to comply with the decision can be referred to arbitration under clause 20.7.

Before a dispute can be referred to arbitration is has to have been first referred to the DAB. This is because clause 20.6 and 20.7 anticipates that once a DAB decision has been given, it will either be subject to a notice of dissatisfaction (so being final, but not binding) or in the absence of a notice it will become final and binding. If a notice of dissatisfaction is given the dispute that was the subject of the DAB decision can be
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opened up, reviewed and revised. Under Clause 20.7 the DAB’s decision is not opened up, reviewed or revised; it is just the failure to comply with the decision that is referred to arbitration. Dissatisfaction with the decision is the trigger under clause 20.6, while a simply failure to comply with a final and binding decision is the trigger under clause 20.7.

In this case notices of dissatisfaction were issued by PGN. The DAB decision was, therefore final but not binding.

The claimant, CRW, pleaded the case on the basis that there were two disputes. The first was the subject matter of the dispute that was referred to the DAB. The second was the defendant’s failure to pay the amount ordered to be paid in the DAB decision. The judge said at paragraph 31:

“Given the opening words of sub-cl 20.6, the Second Dispute was plainly outside the scope of sub-cl 20.6 of the Conditions of Contract. It follows that the Majority Tribunal, and hence the Majority Award, exceeded the scope of the Arbitration Agreement the Majority Award is therefore liable to be set aside …”

CRW referred the disputes to arbitration under clause 20.6. The arbitrator’s awarded payment on the basis that they could enforce the DAB’s decision, so ordering immediate payment. The judge took the view that the arbitration tribunal did not have jurisdiction in the first place, because the failure to pay had not been referred to the DAB. The disputed DAB decision had been referred to arbitration, and so the tribunal had jurisdiction to open up, review or revise the DAB decision (under clause 20.6), set out to simply enforce the failure to comply with it under clause 20.7. As the tribunal had issued a final arbitration award they had apparently made the DAB decision ‘final and binding’ and so acted beyond their powers. The High Court of Singapore therefore set aside the tribunal’s award. The tribunal had to hear the merits of the dispute before giving a final award in respect of the dispute that was the subject matter of the DAB’s decision.

The High Court of Singapore suggests that the better practice, for a winning party faced with a notice of dissatisfaction, is to submit the dispute to arbitration requesting the arbitral tribunal to:

1. Review and revise the decision; and/or
2. Review and confirm the decision

In addition, the referring party could ask for an interim payment reflecting the amount of the DAB decision which the tribunal believe should be paid forthwith. The tribunal could then decide on an immediate interim basis how much, if anything, should be paid.

The arbitral tribunal could then adopt a short timetable in order to deal with the question as to whether an interim payment should be made. This can be associated with the ICC’s Rules of Association although there are also some specific fast track arbitration procedures available.

Summary

In summary, it is useful to address the specific questions raised at the start of this paper, and also to reflect upon the best practice or perhaps more literally the traps for
the unwary that need to be considered not just when enforcing, but when referring a dispute to a DAB. In respect of the specific questions:

1. A DAB’s decision that is binding, binds both parties and the DAB in respect of its future conduct. If a DAB has already made a decision in respect of a dispute, then, subject to any new facts, the DAB is bound by its past decision. This is clearly also the case if the decision is final and binding, or final and conclusive of binding. The difference between a decision being “binding”, or “final and binding” is that the arbitral tribunal can consider the failure to promptly give effect to a DAB’s final and binding decision and issue an interim award for immediate payment. It is not simply the words “final and binding” that lead to this conclusion, but the drafting of clause 20 in general.

2. An interim arbitration award could provide for immediate payment in respect of the DAB’s decision if the tribunal is satisfied that the DAB had jurisdiction to issue the decision.

3. If the arbitral tribunal consider the underlying substantive dispute and come to the conclusion that some amount is certainly to be due and owing to one party then an arbitral tribunal could in any event make an interim award.

4. A failure to comply with a final and binding DAB’s decision will most likely have to be referred to international commercial arbitration rather than a local court. There may be some instances where a local court will consider that there is no material dispute about the DAB’s decision, and therefore award a payment, but that is likely to happen in the English court because a stay under section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996 would be almost certain.

5. It is not possible to treat a DAB’s decision as an arbitral award. If the FIDIC contract was drafted to make a DAB’s decision become an arbitral award in an attempt to make use of the New York Convention for the purpose of enforcements, it would most likely fail when the award came to be enforced. The New York Convention requires there to be a clear arbitration agreement at the outset, and that would not be present. On the other hand, there is a little reason why the entire contractual dispute board procedure could not be transformed into a time limited arbitration procedure, but that formality would dispense with the dispute avoiding purpose of the DAB, and be unwelcome.

6. If either party fails to serve a notice of dissatisfaction such that the DAB’s decision becomes final and binding, then the initial assumption is that neither party can dispute the DAB’s decision. However, the arbitral tribunal’s role is not simply one of rubber stamping the DAB’s decision. In respect of the failure to promptly give effect to the decision, the tribunal will need to consider the jurisdiction of the DAB not just at the outset of the DAB procedures but also during the proceedings and then in respect of the giving of the decision itself. The open up review and revised wording in clause 20.6 may also expand the tribunal’s jurisdiction such that they can consider the law, facts and merits of the underlying dispute. Further, clause 20 does not specifically exclude the right to an appeal from or the ability to of the tribunal to hear the dispute “afresh”.
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Other important factors that the party and the DAB should consider include:

1. The adequacy of the claim. The dispute arises when the claim has been rejected either expressly or by implication. The DAB only has jurisdiction to consider the dispute that is referred to it. It is therefore important that the initial claim is clearly expressed and well substantiated. A nebulous or unsubstantiated claim may lead to a DAB decision which rejects the claim in its entirety. That decision would then be binding, and it is unlikely that it would be possible to refer that dispute back to the DAB. In some circumstances it might be possible (with new facts) to refer a new but related dispute to the DAB. For example, a revised extension of time claim based upon additional facts.

2. The mechanics of the FIDIC contract need to be exhausted before the referral is made. The DAB could of course provide a declaration in respect of the mechanics of the contract or the value of certain items of work. However, an order for one party to make a payment to the other might be far more useful. For this to be effective the claim would need to have been made in an application for payment which is then subject to an unfavourable interim payment certificate. For an Employer’s claim for payment the Employer will need to have followed the clause 2.5 procedure. A clause 3.5 determination by the engineer may also provide a useful opportunity to provide further information and request a more favourable outcome. This is often overlooked, before referring a matter to the DAB.

3. Parties often fail to comply with the conditions precedent in construction contracts. Care is needed to issue a notice of dispute within the time required by clause 20.1, and also to serve a notice of dissatisfaction if applicable, within 28 days.

4. Any notices served must be clear and concise. Imprecise, incomplete or vague notices simply create further disputes.

5. Uncertain or incomplete notices of dissatisfaction can make it difficult to determine whether the appropriate route to arbitration is under clause 20.6 and or clause 20.7. So clarity in the notices of dissatisfaction is also crucial.

6. The DAB needs to set a procedure that provides for it to deliver its DAB decision within 84 days, or such period as may be extended by agreement with the parties.

7. The DAB should also ensure that it deals with all of the matters in dispute, but does not act beyond its powers.

8. The DAB needs to ensure that it complies with any rules relating to due process or natural justice. A failure to give either party a proper opportunity to respond to allegations made, albeit within a limited timetable could amount to a fundamental breach of the DAB process.

9. The DAB should also provide reasons for its decision. These need not be detailed and expansive, but should be sufficient for a third party to identify the logical steps from the matters in dispute to the relief awarded.
Finally, the referral to arbitration needs to be carefully pleaded in order to make sure that appropriate and applicable relief is requested under the correct FIDIC clause.

Conclusion

It is important and interesting to note in ICC Case 10619 that the Arbitral Tribunal robustly enforced the Engineer’s decision by way of any interim award. This, then, provides a mechanism for a party to seek immediate enforcement of that award. In effect, the purpose of the Engineer’s decision is being achieved in the interim by the immediately enforceable arbitration award.

Perhaps the more important question is whether this logic can now be applied to the decisions of dispute adjudication boards under the new FIDIC Contracts. The Engineer has been replaced by a Dispute Adjudication Board that makes decisions which are binding unless or until they are revised in an arbitration. While it may appear that a decision of a DAB should be honoured immediately and, in the event of a failure, an Arbitral Tribunal should immediately provide an interim award allowing for enforcement, this approach has not been adopted universally.

The Singapore case of PGN v CRW demonstrates that there are pitfalls for the unwary in the distinction between the commencement of arbitration under clause 20.6 and clause 20.7, although a request for interim payment may provide the tribunal with the jurisdiction to order immediate payment of an amount representing the DAB’s decision. Nonetheless, what is really required is a move towards immediate enforcement (subject to some limited safeguards) by adopting the policy based “pay now argue later” approach.

Much depends upon the nature and experience of the Arbitral Tribunal, its interpretation of the words of the contract and its domestic law experiences. Those that have experienced domestic adjudication in England, New Zealand, Australia and Singapore may feel more confident to enforce decisions immediately, following the approach of the domestic courts in those countries. No doubt, over time, a more consistent approach will develop and tribunals will have a greater level of confidence of the immediate enforcement of these awards.

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